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NOTES

“Why the Fuss?”
STERN V. MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
UNDERSTANDING OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
JURISDICTION
Estragon:
Vladimir:
Estragon:
Vladimir:

Let’s go.
We can’t.
We’re waiting for Godot.
Ah!1

INTRODUCTION
In the 1982 landmark case, Northern Pipeline v.
Marathon, the Supreme Court ruled that the broad jurisdiction
granted to bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 was unconstitutional.2 The Court ruled that Congress
could not confer such broad jurisdiction on a non-Article III court
because bankruptcy judges lack the life tenure and guaranteed
salary that the Constitution requires of judges who exercise the
judicial power of the United States.3 The ruling was significant
because it marked the first time the Supreme Court had checked
Congress’s power to create a non-Article III tribunal. In 1984,
Congress responded by narrowing the scope of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. The bankruptcy community was dubious that the
changes had solved the constitutional problems.4 In the ensuing
years, like Samuel Beckett’s characters Estragon and Vladimir,
bankruptcy attorneys waited for the Supreme Court to revisit

1

SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT 10 (Grove Press 1954).
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1982).
3
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4
See Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part I): The Statutory Limits
of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 8, Aug. 2011, at 1-16.
2
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the issue.5 At the beginning of each Supreme Court session,
members of the bankruptcy community predicted that this
would be the year when the Court would finally address the
constitutionality of the bankruptcy system.6 Finally, after
twenty-seven years of silence, the bankruptcy equivalent of
Godot arrived in the most unlikely form—a probate dispute
between a former Playboy model turned reality television star
and her significantly older stepson, which ultimately was
resolved by the Supreme Court.
In June of 2011, the Supreme Court reexamined the
constitutionality of bankruptcy court jurisdiction in Stern v.
Marshall.7 The Court once again narrowed the scope of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction and ruled that a bankruptcy
court could not enter a final judgment on a counterclaim
brought by Vickie Lynn Marshall—who was better known by
her stage name, Anna Nicole Smith—against Pierce Marshall,
the son of Vickie’s deceased husband.8 Anticipating the concern
that Stern would cause in the bankruptcy community, Chief
Justice Roberts repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of the
Court’s holding.9 In the closing paragraphs of the majority
opinion, the Chief Justice asked, “If our decision today does not
change all that much, then why the fuss?”10
This note attempts to answer that question. Indeed, this
note’s thesis is that Stern does not, in fact, “change all that
much,” but rather reflects the fact the Supreme Court is much
“fussier” about policing the contours of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction than it is about policing the jurisdiction of other nonArticle III tribunals. This note argues that the Supreme Court
applies a separate, stricter, and more formal interpretation of
Article III when scrutinizing the boundaries of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction than it applies when performing the same kind of
analysis with respect to other non-Article III adjudicative bodies.
Part I of this note traces the development of the Supreme
Court’s Article III jurisprudence with respect to the evolving
scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Part I reveals that, when
confronted with challenges to the jurisdiction of non-Article III
courts, the Supreme Court has historically taken a pragmatic
5

ELIZABETH WARREN
AND CREDITORS 803, 811 (6th ed.
6
7
8
9
10

& JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
2009).

Id. at 811.
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 2620.
Id.
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approach—except in cases dealing with the judicial power of
bankruptcy courts. Part II discusses the background, procedural
history, and holding of Stern. Part III argues that the Court’s
literal application of Article III in Stern v. Marshall reflects the
analytical framework by which the Supreme Court has and will
continue to assess the constitutionality of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, even as the Court continues to apply a more
pragmatic approach in cases involving other types of non-Article
III tribunals. Additionally, Part III attempts to explain why the
Court has adopted this analytical framework exclusively in the
bankruptcy court context. Part IV suggests that, despite the
Court’s inclination to cabin the judicial power of bankruptcy
courts, the holding of Stern is narrow. To demonstrate the likely
limited impact of Stern on bankruptcy courts’ power to efficiently
restructure debtor-creditor relations, Part IV analyzes Stern’s
effect on bankruptcy courts’ authority to issue final judgments on
fraudulent conveyance claims and on litigants’ ability to consent
to the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. Finally, this note
concludes with recommendations for legislative enactments that
could alter the Supreme Court’s approach to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, making it more pragmatic and deferential.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE III

A literal interpretation of Article III, Section 1 of the
U.S. Constitution is impossible. Article III, Section 1, provides:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good
behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.11

However, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that
Congress has the power “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court . . . . ”12 A literal reading of Congress’s Article I,
Section 8 power to create inferior tribunals in conjunction with
Article III’s requirements suggests that all judges vested with
the judicial power of the United States must enjoy life tenure
and a guaranteed salary. If this requirement were enforced, the
multitude of Article I adjudicators now in existence would be
11
12

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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out of work—including, for example, magistrate judges and
administrative law judges, not to mention bankruptcy judges.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a
literal interpretation of Article III is neither possible nor
practical. Under what scholars have dubbed the “adjunct
theory,”13 the Court has routinely permitted Congress to create
non-Article III courts to preside over matters that traditionally
lie within the business of Article III judges.14 This theory views
non-Article III judges as merely “worker bees” who operate
under the direct oversight of Article III judges.15 In order to
ease a perpetually overcrowded federal docket, the Court has in
all but two instances—which both involved the authority of
bankruptcy courts—adopted a pragmatic and flexible approach
in analyzing the requirements of Article III.
This section will trace the development of the Court’s
application of Article III to congressionally created adjudicative
bodies. At first glance, the Court’s choice of factors to consider in
determining whether a non-Article III judge may adjudicate a
certain type of claim appears ad hoc. As Justice Scalia observed
in his concurrence in Stern v. Marshall, these considerations
seem “to have entered [the Court’s] jurisprudence randomly.”16
13

Professor Fallon observed that there are two lines of Supreme Court cases
that challenge a literal interpretation of Article III. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915,
921-26 (1988). The first line of cases involve what Fallon refers to as “so-called
‘legislative courts’—adjudicative bodies created by Congress under Article I and not
bound by Article III’s guarantee that federal judges should enjoy life tenure and
protection against reduction in salaries.” Id. at 921. Fallon traces the origins of
“legislative courts” to the nineteenth century case American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. 511, 545-46 (1828), in which Chief Justice Marshall “held that Congress may create
non-Article III courts to adjudicate disputes in federal territories.” Fallon, supra, at 922.
The second line of cases, which derived from Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir.
1930), involves adjuncts and administrative agencies “established by Congress to
administer [and adjudicate] statutory schemes of federal regulation.” Fallon, supra, at
923. As Congress initially found constitutional authority to establish bankruptcy courts
under the latter line of cases, id. at 928, this note will primarily focus on the interaction
of adjunct courts and Article III. Practically speaking, however, the distinction between
legislative courts and adjunct courts is insignificant. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
197, 201 (1983) (observing that, “[T]he differences between the two types of non-Article
III bodies are, at least for constitutional purposes, superficial.”).
14
See Redish, supra note 13, at 198. “[S]ince early in the nation’s history, the
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may, as an exercise of one or another of
its enumerated powers, create courts whose judges do not receive the Article III salary
and tenure protections.” Such courts are commonly referred to as “Article I” or
“legislative” courts. Id.
15
LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 94 (3d ed. 2009) (“If [non-Article III
courts] perform adjudicative duties for Article III courts, there is no serious conflict
with Article III, and the separation of powers is preserved.”).
16
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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However, the Court’s seemingly scatter-shot approach to Article
III jurisprudence appears less random and more coherent when
viewed with an understanding that the Court scrutinizes the
adjudicative authority of bankruptcy courts more closely than
it does other non-Article III tribunals. The canonical cases
demonstrate that the Court applies a bifurcated approach,
whereby it rubber-stamps Congressional decisions to delegate
adjudicative authority to non-Article III tribunals, except in
cases involving the judicial power of bankruptcy judges.
A.

Crowell v. Benson: The Court Adopts a Pragmatic
Approach to Article III

The first major Supreme Court opinion of the modern
era in which the Court employed a pragmatic, rather than
literal, approach to Article III was Crowell v. Benson.17 In
Crowell, J.B. Knudsen, a longshoreman, was injured while
working on a derrick barge owned by his employer, Charles
Benson. The barge was moored in the Mobile River in Alabama.18
Knudsen brought a claim against Benson under the 1927
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.19 Deputy Commissioner
Crowell of the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission
adjudicated the claim, finding in favor of Knudsen and awarding
him damages.20 In the district court, Benson challenged the
enforcement of the award on the ground that Knudsen was not
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his
injury and that therefore the claim “was not within the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner.”21 The district court
ordered a hearing so that it could review de novo the
determination of law made by the Deputy Commissioner.22
Subsequently, the district court reversed the Deputy
Commissioner’s decision, vacating the award on the ground
that Knudsen was not in the employ of Benson at the time of
the injury.23 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.24

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

285 U.S. 22, 56-58 (1932).
Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir. 1930).
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36-37.
Id.
Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The question confronting the Court was whether
“Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which
the judicial power of the United States is vested, an
administrative agency—in this instance a single deputy
commissioner—for the final determination of [a question of
fact].”25 Thus, the Court addressed whether a non-Article III
federal tribunal could constitutionally adjudicate a federal
claim between two private parties. The Court had a choice.
First, the Court could adopt a literal interpretation of Article
III, ruling that any federal adjudicative body that did not
satisfy the literal requirements of Article III was
unconstitutional. Alternatively, the Court could harmonize
Articles I and III by adopting a practical interpretation of
Article III. The Court chose the latter approach, ruling that
administrative law courts are “instruments” of and subject to
review by Article III courts.26 The Court acknowledged the
“utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the
investigation and finding of facts within their proper province,”
but, notably, the Court considered the possibility that the
power of non-Article III tribunals needed some limitations.27 In
order to strike the proper balance, the Court took its cue from
the federal statute, which authorized only Article III courts to
enforce an employee’s claim for damages against his employer.
The Court devised a compromise that made available to
workers, such as Knudsen, expedited administrative review of
their claims, while providing Article III courts the authority to
supervise the decisions and enforce the awards of adjudicative
bodies that Congress had provisionally vested with the judicial
power of the United States.28
In balancing the complexities of the modern
administrative state with the Court’s obligation to adhere to
Article III’s explicit commands, the Court distinguished
between the determination of questions of fact and questions of
law made by administrative courts. The Court explained that
“[t]here is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of
25

Id. at 56.
YACKLE, supra note 15, at 96.
27
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57.
28
As Professor Judith Resnik observes, “In a Solominic move, the Court ‘split
the difference;’ it upheld Congress’ decision to place adjudicatory power in a non-Article
III institution and yet simultaneously permitted the Article III judge’s ruling to stand,
and Benson, the employer, to prevail.” Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 594 (1985).
26
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fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges.”29 The
Court ruled that, upon review, the factual findings of
administrative law judges “shall be final” so long as they are
“supported by evidence and within the scope of [the judge’s]
authority,”30 but Article III courts would conduct a de novo
review of any determinations of law.31
B.

United States v. Raddatz: The Federal Magistrate
System Affirmed

Magistrate judges have been around in one form or
another since the Judiciary Act of 1789.32 They possessed only
very limited authority, however, until Congress incrementally
expanded it by enacting several pieces of legislation during the
29

Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 46. (“[T]here can be no doubt that the act contemplates that as to
questions of fact, airing with respect to injuries to employees within the purview of the
act, the findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within the
scope of his authority, shall be final. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious
purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to
examination and determination by an administrative agency specifically assigned to
that task.”); see also Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1375 (1953) (“[T]he
apparently solid thing about Crowell is the holding that administrative findings of nonconstitutional and jurisdictional facts may be made conclusive upon the courts, if not
infected with any error of law, as a basis for judicial enforcement of a money liability of
one private person to another.”).
31
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 64. At Harvard Law School in the 1950s, Professor
Henry Hart warned students in his Federal Courts class that, while reading Crowell, to
not make the “simple mistake[]” of “concentrat[ing] on what [the Court] said Congress
could not do.” Hart, supra note 30, at 1374-75 (emphasis added). Professor Hart was
referring to the perception that, post-Crowell, the Court had seemingly reduced
administrative law judges to mere fact-finders whose declarations of law would not
carry weight upon review in an Article III court. Rather, Crowell revealed that the
Court was willing to take a pragmatic approach to Article III and not require Congress
to adhere to its literal requirements. Since then, there has been a proliferation of
administrative law judges throughout the federal system. As of the year 2000, the
federal government employed nearly 1300 administrative law judges. See RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 367 (5th ed. 2003). Crowell’s legacy is evident in how Article III judges have
come to rely on their Article I counterparts to keep a backlogged judicial system
moving. Indeed, observing the impact of Crowell, Professor Fallon, notes,
30

[T]he legal doctrine validating adjudication by administrative agencies
establishes the impracticability of Article III literalism . . . . Anticipating the
vital role of administrative adjudication, Crowell sought to preserve the role
of the article III courts not by excluding agencies from adjudication
altogether, but by requiring de novo review of the most important agency
decisions in private cases.
Fallon, supra note 13, at 925.
32
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 stat. 73.
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1960s and 1970s, culminating with the passage of the 1979
Federal Magistrates Act.33 The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the newly redesigned and more robust
magistrate system in United States v. Raddatz, reasoning that
Congress’s approach “strikes the proper balance between the
demands of due process and the constraints of Art. III.”34
Raddatz was indicted for receiving a firearm in violation of
a federal statute.35 Before trial, Raddatz filed a motion to suppress
certain inculpatory statements he made to federal officers.36 The
district court referred the motion to a magistrate.37 After holding
an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate recommended in his
report and findings that the motion to suppress be denied.38 On
appeal, the district court reviewed de novo the record of the
hearing and accepted the magistrate’s recommendation.39 Raddatz
was found guilty and appealed from the district court judgment
on the ground “that the review procedures established by
§ 636(b)(1) permitting the district court judge to make a de novo
determination of contested credibility assessments without
personally hearing the live testimony, violated . . . Art. III of
the United States Constitution.”40 The Supreme Court
disagreed, reasoning that although the district judge could
choose to hold a de novo evidentiary hearing, Article III did not
compel the district judge to “personally . . . hear the controverted
testimony” so as “to make an independent evaluation of
33

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1968 authorized magistrates “to serve as
special masters, to provide ‘assistance to district judges in the conduct of pretrial
discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions,’ and to conduct ‘preliminary review of
motions for posttrial Relief[.]’” FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 404. Amendments
enacted in 1976 expanded the authority of magistrate judges even further. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006). Significantly, a magistrate judge’s finding under
§ 636(b)(1)(A) is subject to review only under the highly deferential “clearly erroneous”
standard. Moreover, an Article III judge may authorize a magistrate judge to “conduct
hearings, including evidentiary hearings.” Id. § 636(b)(1)(B). However, the magistrate
judge may only make “proposed findings of fact” on such “dispositive” motions “with the
presiding judge still required to make a ‘de novo’ determination of those findings to
which objections is raised.” FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 404. Under the 1979 Act,
with the consent of the parties, magistrate judges could now “conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury trial or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in
the case, when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district
court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Losing parties could then appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id. § 636(c)(3).
34
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1980).
35
Id. at 669.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 671-72.
39
Id. at 672.
40
Id. at 677. Raddatz also alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which the Court ultimately rejected. Id. at 680-81.
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credibility.”41 The district judge had the discretion to determine
how much “weight” to give the magistrate’s “proposed findings
of facts and recommendations.”42 Ultimately, the Court held
that no Article III violation occurred because Raddatz’s
evidentiary hearing took place “under the district court’s total
control and jurisdiction.”43 Although magistrate judges have
power to propose findings and recommendations on a broad
variety of claims and motions, Congress had ensured that the
presiding district court judge, as in Crowell, retained the final
word on such decisions.44
C.

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.

In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.,45 the Supreme Court for the first time invalidated the
adjudicative authority of a non-Article III federal tribunal. To
understand the full significance of the Court’s decision in Northern
Pipeline, a brief detour through the history of the perpetually
shifting contours of bankruptcy court jurisdiction is required.
1. The Origin of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
Until the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the
1898 Act), except in the cases of a handful of responses to
periodic financial panics that occurred during the nineteenth
century, Congress did not make broad use of its Article I,
41

Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 683.
43
Id. at 681-84 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Thus, although the statute
permits the district court to give the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact and
recommendations ‘such weight as [their] merit commands and the sound discretion of
the judge warrants,’ . . . that delegating does not violate Art. III so long as the ultimate
decision is made by the court.”). The fact that the district court retains the ultimate
control is central to why the Court approved of the magistrate system. See id. at 684-86
(“[W]e confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in Art. III judges the
discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial
assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control over the
assistants’ activities.”).
44
See id. at 681 (upholding the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates
Act because the “[decision-making process of magistrates] takes place under the
district court’s total control and jurisdiction”). Congress heard Crowell’s holding loud
and clear when it expanded the power of magistrate judges. According to Professor
Resnik, “Congress . . . mimicked the Crowell dependency model (deputy commissioner
as supervised by and reliant upon an Article III judge) when it authorized increased
powers for magistrates.” Resnik, supra note 28, at 596.
45
See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982).
42
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Section 8 power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”46 The 1898 Act
designated the district courts as “courts of bankruptcy” and
authorized them to appoint bankruptcy “referees” for six-year
terms to preside over bankruptcy proceedings within each
district.47 Bankruptcy referees did not become known as
“bankruptcy judges” until the Supreme Court promulgated the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 1973.48
Under the 1898 Act, the scope of jurisdiction confided to
bankruptcy referees was, according to Professors Warren and
Westbrook, “arcane and confusing.”49 The 1898 Act distinguished
between proceedings that fell within the “plenary jurisdiction” of
the district court and those that fell within the “summary
jurisdiction” of the bankruptcy court.50 In this “convoluted,
bifurcated scheme,” actions that were within the court’s “plenary
jurisdiction” were ordinary civil actions that could only be
adjudicated in an Article III district court, whereas actions
within the court’s “summary jurisdiction” were bankruptcyrelated actions that the bankruptcy court had authority to hear
and decide.51 In essence, bankruptcy referees had authority to
hear and enter final judgments in proceedings directly related
to bankruptcy proceedings, in proceedings directly related to
liquidating the debtor’s property and distributing it to
creditors, and, upon the consent of the parties, in proceedings
involving nonbankruptcy claims that would otherwise fall
within the plenary jurisdiction of the district court.52
In practice, however, the authority of bankruptcy
referees was less clear than these labels might suggest, and
bankruptcy court jurisdiction was persistently challenged by
nondebtors, who sought to avoid litigating in bankruptcy courts
by claiming that they had not truly consented to bankruptcy
court jurisdiction or that their claims or the trustee’s claims
46

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of
Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41.
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 768 (2000) (“Bankruptcy would not become a permanent
institution in this country until 1898.”); Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, The Judicial Conference, and the Legislative
Process, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 2-12 (1985); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 6-32 (1995).
47
Countryman, supra note 46, at 2-12.
48
Id.
49
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 800.
50
See generally Countryman, supra note 46, at 2-3.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 2-12. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the abilities of parties to
consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
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against them were not related to the bankruptcy.53 According to
a report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the division
of jurisdiction under the 1898 Act caused several problems:
The first is delay. Not only are the proceedings in non-bankruptcy
cases likely to be paced more slowly with longer intervals between
successive steps, but the dockets of the non-bankruptcy courts are
likely to be more crowded . . . . Another objection . . . is the extra
expense entailed by the estate in litigating outside the bankruptcy
court . . . . The most serious objection . . . is the frequent, timeconsuming, and expensive litigation of the question whether the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a particular proceeding.54

In 1978, Congress undertook the first comprehensive
overhaul of federal bankruptcy law since the 1898 law was
enacted. In designing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
1978 Act), Congress set out to resolve the confusion and
procedural difficulties created by the 1898 Act, especially the
confusion that had resulted from the 1898 Act’s bewildering
distinction between plenary and summary jurisdiction. Following
what it believed to be the path carved by the Court’s affirmation
of the adjunct theory in Crowell and Raddatz, Congress
established “in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the district
court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a
court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the district.”55 The 1978 Act authorized the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint bankruptcy
judges.56 Unlike district court judges, however, bankruptcy
judges would enjoy neither the Article III protection of lifetime
tenure—they would serve fourteen-year terms—nor the
protection of a guaranteed salary.57 The 1978 Act provided that
all decisions by the bankruptcy court were subject to appellate
review within each federal circuit.58
In an attempt to simplify and expand the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts, the 1978 Act granted bankruptcy courts
authority over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
53

See Countryman, supra note 46, at 2-12.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 44-45 (1977).
28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982). Bankruptcy Court judges are subject to removal
by the “judicial counsel of the circuit” on account of “incompetency, misconduct, neglect
of duty, or physical or mental disability.” Id.
56
Id. §§ 152-153.
57
See id. §§ 152-154. See infra Part III.D for a discussion on the debate
concerning whether to grant Article III status to bankruptcy judges which arose in the
lead up to passing the 1978 Act.
58
See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 55 (1982) (describing the review process for bankruptcy appeals).
54
55
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arising in or related to cases under title 11.”59 Although, as
Professor Brubaker has pointed out, “[Congress], somewhat
ironically, thought that the powerful breadth of the jurisdictional
provisions would ‘leave no doubt as to the scope of the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over disputes,’”60 the bankruptcy
community’s understanding of the constitutional power of the
bankruptcy court was about to be thrown into flux.61
2. Northern Pipeline v. Marathon
In a surprising move that caught Congress and
bankruptcy lawyers off guard,62 the Court held that the judicial
power vested in bankruptcy judges under the 1978 Act violated
Article III and thus was unconstitutional.63 The facts of the case
are straightforward. After Northern Pipeline Construction
Company (Northern Pipeline) filed a Chapter 11 petition in the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota, it commenced
a common law breach of contract action against Marathon
Pipeline Company (Marathon) in bankruptcy court.64 Marathon
moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that the 1978 Act’s
conferral of jurisdiction to a federal bankruptcy court to hear a
state common law contract claim violated Article III’s
requirement that the judicial power of the United States be
vested only in judges who enjoy lifetime tenure and a
guaranteed salary.65
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan
recounted why the Framers had intentionally distributed
59

28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) (amended 1984).
Brubaker, supra note 46, at 799 (footnote omitted).
61
The 1970 National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended to
Congress that the reformulated bankruptcy courts receive a broad grant of jurisdiction.
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 727 (1997).
According to the 1970 Commission Report:
60

The constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction in such comprehensive terms
should not be subject to any serious doubt. The jurisdictional grants to the
court of bankruptcy by the Acts of 1841 and 1867 were almost as extensive,
and the Supreme Court gave the provisions of those Acts generous
construction and approval of their constitutionality. There appears to be no
reason why Congress cannot in the exercise of its power under the
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution confer jurisdiction over all litigation
having a significant connection with bankruptcy.
Id.
62
63
64
65

Id.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 50.
Id. at 56-57.
Id.
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power among the tripartite federal government and concluded
that Article III is “an inseparable element of the constitutional
system of checks and balances.”66 Justice Brennan stated that
“[t]he judicial power of the United States must be exercised by
courts having the attributes prescribed in Art. III.”67 The
“attributes” to which Justice Brennan referred were the
Constitution’s explicit requirement that judges exercising the
judicial power of the United States enjoy life tenure and a
guaranteed salary. Justice Brennan explained that the
requirements of Article III operate as a structural safeguard to
ensure that the judiciary remains truly fair and independent.68
Inasmuch as the 1978 Act provided that bankruptcy judges
would be appointed for fixed terms, Justice Brennan concluded,
“There is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges created by the
Act are not Art. III judges.”69
In what appears to be a dramatic about-face from prior
precedent, the four-Justice plurality declared that Congress’s
authority to delegate adjudicative power to non-Article III
tribunals “reduce[s] to three narrow situations,” which include
the authority to create “territorial courts,” the authority to
adjudicate court martial proceedings, and the authority to
adjudicate cases involving “public rights.”70 Although the Court’s
turn toward a literal application of Article III signified a
departure from the more pragmatic approach it had adopted in
Crowell and Raddatz, the Court’s newfound appreciation for
formalism should not be overstated. Significantly, the plurality’s
formal understanding of Article III and its limited approval of
Congress’s authority to create non-Article III tribunals lacked
support among the other five Justices and thus failed to become
controlling law.71 The only point that a majority of the Justices
did agree on was the decision to invalidate the 1978 Act’s broad
jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts because Congress
had unconstitutionally vested the essential attributes of judicial
power in a non-Article III court.72

66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60-61.
Id.
Id. at 64-67.
Id.
Id. at 86.
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3. The Fallout from Northern Pipeline
In response to Northern Pipeline, Congress enacted the
1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 (the 1984 Amendments).73 The 1984 Amendments
narrowed the 1978 Act’s broad grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts by distinguishing between “core” and “noncore” claims.74 Bankruptcy judges were given authority to enter
orders and final judgments with respect to “core” claims. With
respect to claims that were “non-core-but-related-to” the
bankruptcy case, bankruptcy courts were authorized only to
make proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law that
would be reviewed de novo by district courts.75 However,
following the magistrate model and the long-standing tradition
of consent under the old referee system, Congress authorized
bankruptcy judges to enter final judgment on “non-core-butrelated-to” claims so long as both parties consented.76
In the immediate aftermath of Northern Pipeline,
scholars predicted disastrous consequences for the future of
bankruptcy proceedings.77 In reality, however, business in the
bankruptcy courts continued as usual under the 1984
Amendments. Over the coming decades, Northern Pipeline
never became the life-altering event that bankruptcy experts
had initially predicted.78 Although Northern Pipeline has never
been explicitly overruled, two subsequent opinions appeared to
limit Northern Pipeline to its facts and offer a more functional
understanding of Article III than the plurality adopted in
Northern Pipeline.

73

See Tabb, supra note 46, at 38-40.
28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). Under § 157(b), Congress provided a nonexhaustive list of core claims. See id.
75
Id. § 157(c)(1).
76
Id. § 157(c)(2).
77
In the year following Northern Pipeline, Professor Redish predicted, “The
Northern Pipeline decision creates serious and acute problems for Congress and for the
future of all federal bankruptcy adjudication.” Redish, supra note 13, at 204.
Furthermore, after discussing the perceived consequences of Northern Pipeline,
Professor King declared, “The Supreme Court has created a mess.” Lawrence P. King,
The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 117-18 (1983).
78
Professor McKenzie observes, “The doctrinal developments after Northern
Pipeline, as well as the de facto development of bankruptcy court practice since that
time, have resurrected much of the autonomy that Congress granted to bankruptcy
judges in 1978 and that the Supreme Court had attempted to quash.” Troy A.
McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 747, 766 (2010).
74
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Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.

Just three years after its decision in Northern Pipeline, the
Court returned to a pragmatic approach to Article III. In Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,79 the Court affirmed
Congress’s ability to authorize the use of binding arbitration to
resolve disputes arising from a federal cause of action.80
The case involved the data-consideration and datacompensation provision (the provision) of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).81 FIFRA provides that
to obtain Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approval of a
pesticide, manufacturers must “submit research data to the
[EPA] concerning the product’s health, safety, and environmental
effects.”82 If a competing manufacturer subsequently applies for
EPA approval of a similar product, the EPA may use the first
company’s research to assess the competitor’s product.83 But to
prevent free riding, FIFRA requires that the competitor
provide adequate compensation to the company that produced
the research.84 If the competitors cannot agree on an
appropriate amount of compensation, the statute provides that
“either [party] may invoke binding arbitration. The arbitrator’s
decision is subject to judicial review only for ‘fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct.’”85
Initially, the plaintiffs—a group of thirteen pesticide
manufacturers—brought a claim against the EPA, challenging
the provision’s constitutionality under Article I and the Fifth
Amendment.86 In the wake of the Court’s decision in Northern
Pipeline, however, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to
include allegations that the FIFRA’s use of binding arbitration to
resolve disputes among competitors violated Article III because
FIFRA “allocate[s] to arbitrators the functions of judicial officers
[while] severely limiting review by an Article III court.”87
The tone of the Court’s opinion, written by Justice
O’Connor, differs drastically from the tone adopted by the
Court in Northern Pipeline. Instead of rhapsodizing on the
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 571-75.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
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sanctity of Article III in the introductory paragraphs, as
Justice Brennan did in Northern Pipeline, the Court
emphatically embraced a functional approach to Article III
jurisprudence with the declaration that “[a]n absolute
construction of Article III is not possible.”88 The Court narrowly
limited the holding of Northern Pipeline, stating that the “case
establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under
state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to
ordinary appellate review.”89 Although both Crowell and
Thomas seemingly dealt with state common law claims—
respectively, a contract dispute between an employee and
employer, and a dispute over a property interest—the Court
distinguished both cases from Northern Pipeline. The defining
characteristic enabling Congress to channel both claims to nonArticle III courts is that in each instance a federal statute
“displaced a traditional cause of action and affected a preexisting relationship based on a common-law” claim.90
Significantly, Justice O’Connor cast Thomas as reflecting “the
enduring lesson of Crowell,” and in so doing, focused on the
“substance” of FIFRA in order to determine whether it
contravened Article III.91 The Court abandoned a formal
reading of Article III and instead balanced the “substance” of
the delegation of adjudicatory authority against the purpose
behind Article III’s safeguards of a guaranteed salary and life
tenure to assess whether Congress’s decision to delegate
damaged the integrity and independence of the judiciary.92
E.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor

Four years after Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court
confronted another instance of a non-Article III tribunal
adjudicating a state common law claim. In 1974, when
Congress revamped the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), it
created the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to oversee the implementation of the regulatory regime.93 The
CFTC was charged with adjudicating certain disputes between
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 583.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 584-87.
Id. at 590-91.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836-38 (1986).
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professional commodity brokers and their disgruntled clients
arising from alleged violations of the CEA. Two years later, in
1976, the “CFTC promulgated a regulation” enabling it “to
adjudicate counterclaims arising out of the transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in
the complaint.”94 Such counterclaims included state common
law counterclaims. Of course, the ruling in Northern Pipeline a
few years later arguably called the constitutionality of the
CFTC’s authority to adjudicate state common law
counterclaims into question.
Schor, an investor, filed a complaint with the CFTC
against ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti), a brokerage
house.95 Schor alleged that his debit balance resulted from
Conti’s violations of the CEA.96 Unaware that Schor had filed a
claim with the CFTC, “Conti . . . filed a diversity action in
federal district court to recover the debit balance.”97 Schor then
filed a counterclaim in Conti’s district court suit, alleging the
same CEA violations that were the subject of the CFTC
proceeding.98 Eventually, Conti voluntarily dismissed its claim
in federal court and agreed to litigate Schor’s claim before the
CFTC.99 Conti asserted its claim to recover the debit balance in
the form of a counterclaim in Schor’s CFTC action.100 The
administrative law judge found in favor of Conti on both
Schor’s claim and Conti’s counterclaim.101 On appeal, in the
aftermath of Northern Pipeline, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit ruled that the CFTC’s authority to adjudicate
a state common law counterclaim was unconstitutional.102 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
Again writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged that the Court’s ad hoc approach to Article III,
from Crowell to Thomas, does “not admit of easy synthesis.”103
This time, however, the Court formally introduced a
multifactor balancing test to determine whether Congress has
constitutionally authorized a non-Article III tribunal to
adjudicate the business of Article III Courts, or whether
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 848-59.
Id. at 847.
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Congress has acted in a way that “impermissibly threatens the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”104 The Court
identified several factors that should be considered, with no
single factor being solely determinative. Thus, a court should
consider: (1) “the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of
judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts”; (2) “conversely,
the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range
of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts”; (3) “the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated”; and (4) “the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of Article III.”105 Applying this
new balancing test to the facts of Schor, the Court concluded
that the CFTC’s authority over a limited class of state law
claims did not violate the structural integrity of Article III.106
II.

STERN V. MARSHALL: THE SUPREME COURT ONCE AGAIN
NARROWS THE SCOPE OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
JURISDICTION

A.

The Love of the Last Tycoon

In the early 1990s, before finding fame as a model and
reality television star under the stage name Anna Nicole
Smith, twenty-four-year-old Vickie Lynn Marshall worked the
day shift as a table dancer at Gigi’s, a gentlemen’s club in
Houston.107 Vickie found herself working as a stripper out of a
desperate need to pay her bills and support her son.108 Born in
1905, the blue-blooded J. Howard Marshall had, over a lifetime
in the oil and natural gas industry, amassed a fortune that
made him one of the 400 richest people in America and the
richest man in Texas.109 By October of 1991, as he mourned the
recent deaths of both his wife of thirty years and his mistress of
ten years, the heartbroken octogenarian had, by all accounts,

104

Id. at 851. As Professor Yackle observed, the Court’s application of a
balancing test on a case-by-case basis “is not the most intellectually satisfying analysis
of constitutional questions.” YACKLE, supra note 15, at 111. Although the Court’s
precedents do not form a neat narrative, as Justice O’Connor admits, perhaps a close
factual inquiry on a case-by-case basis is preferable to the adoption of a bright-line rule
when the stakes are so high—as they are in all of these Article III disputes.
105
Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
106
Id. at 857.
107
For a thorough history of the lives of J. Howard and Vickie, see generally
In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 11-25 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
108
Id. at 20.
109
Id. at 11, 18.
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lost the will to live.110 At the suggestion of his chauffeur, who
had hoped to lift his boss’s spirits, J. Howard made a fortuitous
daytime trip to Gigi’s.111 There, J. Howard met Vickie and was
smitten.112 Within a week, J. Howard told Vickie of his plans to
marry her.113 For over two years, Vickie rebuffed J. Howard’s
proposals of marriage, but she finally agreed to marry him,
which resulted in their wedding in June of 1994.114 In August
1995, J. Howard died of heart failure.115 Although J. Howard
had spent his final years spending millions of dollars on Vickie,
he failed to include her in his will.116 She claimed that she was
entitled to half of J. Howard’s estate. Her significantly older
stepson, Pierce Marshall, the younger of J. Howard’s two sons,
vigorously resisted her claim.
B.

The Procedural History of Stern v. Marshall

An analysis of the contentious and lengthy legal battle
between Vickie and Pierce is worthy of its own epic work.117 For
that reason, this note will focus only on one strand of the
litigation.118 Shortly before J. Howard’s death in 1995, Vickie
brought a claim for tortious interference against Pierce in
Texas state probate court.119 Vickie alleged that Pierce had
fraudulently induced J. Howard on his deathbed to transfer all
his assets to a living trust.120 Pierce denied the allegation and
contended that J. Howard had intended that he be the sole
beneficiary of the estate.121 Deprived of the inheritance that she
expected to receive, and defending a lawsuit brought against
her by a former employee,122 Vickie filed a bankruptcy petition
in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California
(the Bankruptcy Court) in January of 1996.123 In May of the
110

Id. at 13, 16-17, 20-21.
Id. at 21.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 23.
115
See id. at 33.
116
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300 (2006).
117
For a discussion of the lengthy dispute between Vickie and Pierce that has
been litigated in several state and federal courts, see generally id. at 300-05.
118
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
119
See id. at 2601.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Brubaker, supra note 4, at 3.
123
Voluntary Petition Under Chapter 11, In re Marshall, 253 B.R. 550 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (No. 2:96-BK-12510).
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same year, Pierce filed a proof of claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy
case, alleging that Vickie had defamed him by instructing her
lawyers to tell reporters that Pierce had defrauded her out of
her inheritance.124 In response, Vickie filed a counterclaim for
tortious interference—a claim identical to her claim in the
Texas probate court—alleging that Pierce had denied her the
inheritance promised to her by the late J. Howard.125
In September of 2000, the Bankruptcy Court entered a
judgment in favor of Vickie on her counterclaim for tortious
interference, and awarded her over $400 million in compensatory
damages and $25 million in punitive damages.126 Pierce filed a
posttrial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)127 in California district
court, arguing that Vickie’s counterclaim, which was based on
Texas common law, was not a “core proceeding” under
§ 157(b)(2)(C)128 and that therefore the Bankruptcy Court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate it.129 After several appeals, reversals, and
a first trip to the Supreme Court in 2006, where a separate
jurisdictional question was resolved,130 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the question of “whether a bankruptcy court
judge who did not enjoy [Article III] tenure and salary protections
had the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and Article III to enter
final judgment on a counterclaim filed by Vickie . . . against
Pierce . . . in Vickie’s bankruptcy proceedings.”131
C.

Analysis of Stern v. Marshall: Northern Pipeline
Revisited and Resurrected

In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
ruled that although Vickie’s counterclaim qualified as “core,”
and although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory

124

Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
Id.
126
Id. Just several months later, in April of 2001, a Texas probate court held a
jury trial on the dispute. This jury ruled in Pierce’s favor, finding that J. Howard’s will,
which excluded Vickie, was valid. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 302.
127
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2006) (“The district court may withdraw, in whole
or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on
timely motion of any party, for cause shown.”).
128
Id. § 157(b)(2)(C). “Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases
under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11 . . . .” Id. § 157(b)(1)-(2).
See infra Part I.C.3 for an explanation of the “core” and “non-core” distinction that
defines the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
129
See In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 9 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
130
Marshall, 547 U.S. at 300, 301-05.
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Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600.
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authority to enter a final judgment on the claim,132 the
structural safeguards of Article III precluded the Bankruptcy
Court from exercising that authority. The Chief Justice cast
the majority opinion in Stern in the same mold as Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline. Northern
Pipeline opened with an homage to Article III and a discussion of
why its safeguards are vital to the independence of those who
exercise the judicial power of the United States. Stern opened
with the same overture.133 Moreover, in adopting Northern
Pipeline’s holding that a bankruptcy court cannot constitutionally
enter a final judgment on a state law contract claim that is not
essential to the resolution of the bankruptcy, the Chief Justice
wrote, “Substitute ‘tort’ for ‘contract,’ and that statement directly
covers this case.”134 However, unlike Justice Brennan, who in
Northern Pipeline invalidated the 1978 Act’s entire jurisdictional
scheme, Chief Justice Roberts, quite significantly, emphasized
that the holding in Stern is extremely narrow.135
Although the majority opinion suggested that the ruling
in Northern Pipeline predetermined the outcome of Stern,
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, argued that the Court should
have applied an alternative analysis.136 The dissent took issue
with the Chief Justice’s decision to align Stern with the
analysis in Northern Pipeline,137 arguing that the majority
“overstates the importance of an analysis that did not command
a Court majority in Northern Pipeline.”138 Consequently,
according to the dissent, the majority opinion gave short shrift to
the line of cases descending from Crowell that calls for a
pragmatic interpretation of Article III—especially the Court’s
most recent pronouncement in Schor, which, as Justice Breyer
pointed out, did command a majority of the Court and
therefore should represent the controlling precedent.139 In turn,
Justice Breyer applied the balancing test from Schor—a more
flexible and pragmatic standard—to the facts before the
Court.140 Justice Breyer concluded that the bankruptcy court
should have the authority to hear Vickie’s counterclaim
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
Id. at 2608-09.
Id. at 2620.
Id. at 2621-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2622, 2626.
Id. at 2626; see supra Part I.E.
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because such power is necessary “to create an efficient,
effective bankruptcy system.”141
III.

STERN SIGNIFIES A SEPARATE AND MORE FORMAL
ARTICLE III ANALYSIS FOR BANKRUPTCY COURTS

Until handing down the decision in Stern v. Marshall,
the Supreme Court had remained silent on the
constitutionality of the 1984 Amendments for nearly thirty
years.142 Congress and the bankruptcy community knew that
the 1984 Amendment “toe[d] the constitutional line.”143 In the
aftermath of Thomas and Schor, during the great period of
silence on the issue, as each Supreme Court session opened and
closed without any development, Congress and the bankruptcy
community gradually came to accept Northern Pipeline as a
one-shot deal—an aberration in an otherwise complex and
murky line of precedents whose only unifying characteristics
were the Court’s pragmatism and deference to Congress.144
The outcome in Stern v. Marshall did more than shatter
this sense of complacency. It signified that Northern Pipeline is
still good law, and it demonstrated that the Northern Pipeline
approach stands independent of the balancing test adopted in
Schor.145 The first wave of criticism of Stern argued that the
Northern Pipeline approach has overtaken the Schor balancing
test and now stands as the Court’s primary analytical
framework for Article III.146 This note, however, argues that the
Court appears to have adopted a bifurcated approach to
determining the constitutionality of non-Article III
141

Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2630.
See generally NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 61, at 732.
See Brubaker, supra note 4, at 1.
144
According to Professor Yackle, “In light of [Thomas] and Schor, everyone
understands that the Court will rarely find reliance on non-Article III adjudicators
invalid.” YACKLE, supra note 15, at 111.
145
In an article published prior to Stern, Professor McKenzie argues that the
Court’s balancing test adopted in Schor is an ill fit for bankruptcy courts. McKenzie,
supra note 78, at 754. Professor McKenzie’s instincts anticipated the ruling of Stern and
support this note’s thesis that the Court has accepted that there is something different
about bankruptcy courts that necessitates a special and stricter application of Article III.
146
See e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part II): The
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER,
No. 9, Sept. 2011, at 3. Even before Stern, scholars never considered that Northern
Pipeline was a separate analytical framework applicable only to bankruptcy courts. For
example, Professor Chemerinsky argued that Northern Pipeline should be overruled on
the grounds that the Court has abandoned the plurality’s approach in Northern
Pipeline by replacing it with the more pragmatic approach introduced in Thomas and
later refined in Schor. Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to
Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 317-20 (1991).
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adjudicators. Much of the confusion and criticism surrounding
Northern Pipeline stemmed from the fact that it did not make
sense in light of the Court’s other Article III jurisprudence.147
But the development of the case law becomes much clearer
upon understanding that the formal approach to Article III
applied in Northern Pipeline reflects an analytical framework
that is separate and distinct from the Schor balancing test,
reserved exclusively for bankruptcy courts.148 For all non-Article
III adjudicators that are not bankruptcy courts, the Court will
continue to apply the Schor balancing test. When assessing the
adjudicative power of bankruptcy courts, however, the Court
will apply the more formal and literal understanding of Article
III articulated in Northern Pipeline, which limits bankruptcy
courts to entering final judgments on claims that are essential
to the resolution of the bankruptcy.
This section discusses the possible reasons why the
Supreme Court applies a stricter Article III analysis to
bankruptcy courts than to other non-Article III tribunals. It
attributes the Court’s unique approach to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction as a result of issues relating to due process, the
Court’s efforts to reduce the size of the federal docket, a lack of
a practical understanding of bankruptcy law by the Northern
Pipeline plurality and Stern majority, and a long-standing
rivalry between Article III and bankruptcy judges.
A.

An Issue of Due Process

Although the line of cases from Crowell through Stern
has cast the question of whether a non-Article III tribunal has
the constitutional authority to adjudicate certain claims as an
Article III issue, the same question can be characterized as an
issue of due process. Indeed, in his dissent in Crowell, Justice
Brandeis argued that the Court did not face an Article III
question but rather a question of due process.149 Whether the
administrative court had the authority to adjudicate Knudsen’s
Workers’ Compensation claim was entirely dependent on
147

McKenzie, supra note 78, at 770.
This is not the first instance of the Supreme Court applying a special
analysis to bankruptcy courts. For example, although the Supreme Court has ruled
that Congress cannot use any of its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), the Court has
recently created a special exception to the general rule that allows Congress to use its
Article I Bankruptcy Power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, see Cent. Va. Cmty.
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006).
149
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87-88 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
148
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whether the parties were afforded their constitutional right to
due process, which Justice Brandeis described as a “requirement
of judicial process.”150 Justice Brandeis’s suggestion that the
question be viewed through the lens of due process reverberates
through the line of cases descending from Crowell, offering an
explanation for why the Court applies a more heightened and
formal Article III inquiry in the case of bankruptcy courts than
in the case of other non-Article III courts.151
In Schor, Justice O’Connor seemingly relocated Justice
Brandeis’s due process argument to Article III. Justice
O’Connor noted that Article III protects not only “structural
interests”—such as the integrity and independence of the
judicial branch—but also “personal” interests, like the right to
an impartial and independent adjudicator.152 To support this
proposition, Justice O’Connor cited, among other sources,
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Crowell.153 Importantly, as Justice
O’Connor explained in Schor and as Chief Justice Roberts
pointed out in Stern,154 litigating parties may, in certain
situations, waive their right to an Article III judge by consenting
to the jurisdiction of non-Article III tribunals, without violating
both Article III and the maxim that parties may never waive the
requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction.155 The fact that the
nondebtor defendants in Northern Pipeline and Stern could
have consented to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court reveals that, in bankruptcy cases, the Court
is concerned with ensuring that the parties are afforded due
process.156 In other words, if the parties themselves believe that
150

Id.
According to Professor Chemerinsky, “The Court properly has recognized
that Article I courts are impermissible only when they are incompatible with due
process or separation of powers.” Chemerinsky, supra note 146, at 311.
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
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Id.
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Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2011). This note argues that
Stern has not affected the ability of litigants to consent under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)
(2006). However, some commentators argue that Stern has invalidated the ability of
parties to consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See infra Part IV.B for a
discussion of consent.
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Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (“Indeed, the relevance of concepts of waiver to Article
III challenges is demonstrated by our decision in Northern Pipeline, in which the absence
of consent to an initial adjudication before an Article III tribunal was relied on as a
significant factor in determining that Article III forbade such adjudication.”).
156
Id. at 848. Nevertheless, there will be certain cases in which the structural
interests at stake will surpass the personal interests of the parties, making waiver
impossible. Justice O’Connor explains: “When these Article III limitations are at issue,
notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve
institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.” Id. at 851.
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the bankruptcy court provides them with adequate process—a
fair opportunity to litigate their dispute before an impartial
adjudicator—then their consent cures the Article III defects
arising from the fact that bankruptcy judges lack life tenure
and a guaranteed salary.
The Court is appropriately more wary of potential due
process violations before bankruptcy courts than before other
non-Article III adjudicators. Compared to other non-Article III
adjudicators, who also lack life tenure and a guaranteed salary,
bankruptcy judges hear an incredibly wide variety of legal
claims involving huge financial stakes and exercise
extraordinary power with minimal oversight by district courts.157
A district court reviews de novo any conclusions of law made by
an administrative judge as well as any ruling on a dispositive
motion made by a magistrate judge.158 In comparison, a district
court reviews the decision of a bankruptcy court on “core
claims” under the more deferential standard of “clearly
erroneous” and reviews de novo only a bankruptcy court’s
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on “non-corebut-related-to” claims.159 The reality, however, is that district
courts relish the opportunity to pass bankruptcy work to
bankruptcy courts and rarely distinguish between “core” and
“non-core” when reviewing decisions by bankruptcy judges.160
Whether a bankruptcy judge has submitted a final judgment on
a core proceeding or submitted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law on a “non-core-but-related-to” claim, district
courts are quick to affirm with the same rubber stamp.161
Perhaps buried in the subtext of Stern is a message from the
Supreme Court to both Congress and the district courts to
better supervise the activity of the bankruptcy courts.162
157

McKenzie, supra note 78, at 751.
See supra Part I.B.
159
See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2006); id. § 157(c)(1). According to Professor
McKenzie, “[A]ppellate review by Article III courts does not serve as an effective check
on non-Article III judges in bankruptcy cases.” McKenzie, supra note 78, at 751.
Indeed, Article III courts have very little interest in bankruptcy proceedings and tend
not to vigorously review the appeals that work their way up the federal system. Id.
160
See Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1068 n.28 (1994) (“As a practical matter,
there may be precious little difference in how a given district judge reviews cases
involving ‘recommendations’ in non-care matters and those involving ‘final judgments’
in core matters.”).
161
Id.
162
Perhaps the Court has let its Article III doctrine stay intentionally murky
and ambiguous. In a blog post published several months before the Court handed down
Stern, Professor McKenzie reflected on the forthcoming decision and suggested that
“[a] little studied ambiguity keeps the system operating without letting matters get out
158
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Compared to other non-Article III tribunals, bankruptcy
courts have tremendous power to grant remedies without the
aid of district courts.163 The agency court in Crowell, for example,
was forced to rely on the district court to enforce any damages
awarded in an administrative proceeding.164 Demonstrating the
Court’s awareness of this distinction, Justice Brennan observed
in Northern Pipeline that bankruptcy courts “exercise all
ordinary powers of district courts, including the power to preside
over jury trials, . . . the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus, . . . and the power to issue any order, process, or
judgment appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of
Title 11 . . . .”165 The Court is thus attuned to the fact that
bankruptcy judges, who lack life tenure and salary protection,
have the authority to grant extraordinary remedies both in law
and equity. For that reason, the Court keeps bankruptcy courts
on a shorter leash than it does other non-Article III tribunals
by vigorously monitoring the boundaries of the bankruptcy
court’s jurisdiction through the application of a more formal
understanding of Article III.
B.

Reducing Litigation in the Federal Judicial System

Another explanation for the Court’s more formal
approach to Article III and its decision in Stern to narrow the
scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction may be found in the modern
Court’s antagonism toward litigation. Professor Siegel contends
that the defining characteristic of the Rehnquist Court was its
“palpable hostility to litigation.”166 A primary objective of the
Rehnquist Court was to limit access to federal courtrooms by
of hand.” Troy McKenzie, Anna Nicole Smith, Equity, and Article III, CREDIT SLIPS
(Jan. 24, 2011, 4:08 PM), http//www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/01/anna-nicolesmith-equity-and-artilce-iii.html.
163
Professor Samahon writes, “Bankruptcy judges are not mere judicial pawns,
but the knights of the federal judicial hierarchy.” See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy
Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 234
(2008). Bankruptcy courts commonly oversee some of the largest and most significant
business matters of the era. See, e.g., California v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 05
CIV. 4079 (GBD), 2005 WL 1185804 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005) (Enron Corp. bankruptcy);
In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 08-13555 (JMP), 2008 WL 4902202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 2008) (Lehman Brothers bankruptcy).
164
See infra Part I.A.
165
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 (1982);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) (granting equity jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts). See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 223-31
(LexisNexis 2008).
166
Andrew M. Siegel, From Bad to Worse? Some Early Speculation About the
Roberts Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor, 59 S.C. L. REV. 851, 861-62 (2008).
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limiting the scope of federal remedies and federal rights of
action, placing limitations on punitive damages, and making it
more difficult for plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees.167 Picking up
where the Rehnquist Court left off, the Roberts Court has
demonstrated an even more hostile attitude toward litigation.168
The Roberts Court has taken aggressive action to trim the
overtaxed and understaffed federal docket.169 With approximately
1,410,653 bankruptcy filings170 and the commencement of
289,969 civil actions171 at the district level in 2011, and with only
179 circuit judges,172 677 district judges,173 and 350 bankruptcy
judges174 to preside over these matters, the Chief Justice has
legitimate concerns about reducing the volume of litigation
filed in the federal judicial system. One obvious way to scale
back the number of filings in federal courts is to reduce the
167

See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1097 (2006).
168
Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy is grounded in the belief that
the “federal judiciary has grown too expansive.” Andrew M. Siegel, Litigation Hostility in
the Early Roberts Court, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 6, 2007), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2007/06/hostility_to_li.html. The Chief Justice’s hostile view toward
litigation and efforts to restrict access to the federal judicial system is not without its
critics. Professor Spencer argues that the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009), restricts the ability of members of “societal out-groups” to bring claims
against the dominant societal groups. A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide
Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 199-200 (2010).
Furthermore, Professor Siegel describes litigation as “one of the most democratic
institutions we have,” and, by restricting access to it, the Court has harmed the
American democratic system. Siegel, supra note 166, at 862.
169
Notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, the Roberts Court abandoned a plaintiff-friendly pleading regime in favor of
a heightened pleading standard that requires plaintiffs to plead their claims with greater
specificity. Professor Siegel observes, “I have previously suggested that litigation hostility
was the single most important theme of the Rehnquist era, but the theme certainly did
not dominate the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence to the extent that it has dominated the
[Roberts] Court’s thus far.” Siegel, supra note 166, at 861-62. Between 25 and 30% of the
Rehnquist Court’s cases dealt with access to the federal court system while the
percentage has dramatically risen under the Roberts Court. Id. Indeed, the 2006
Supreme Court has become known as “the year [the Court] closed the courts.” Id.
170
The United States Courts website tracks the judicial business of Article III and
bankruptcy courts. See Judicial Caseload Indicators, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2011/Dec11/Dec11Indicators.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
171
Id.
172
The United States Courts website also provides statistics about the
number of Article III judges in service. See Federal Judgeships, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited
Jan. 20, 2013).
173
Id.
174
The Federal Judicial Center website provides statistics about the number
of bankruptcy judges in service. See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_bank.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
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jurisdictional scope of federal tribunals—the approach utilized
in Stern. Whether the elimination of counterclaims from the
bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction will reduce the workload of
bankruptcy and district courts remains to be seen.175 In any
event, the ruling in Stern makes litigating state law claims
that are not closely related to the ongoing bankruptcy
considerably more burdensome for all parties.176
Lurking in the background of the majority opinion in
Stern are federalism issues that overlap with the Court’s
hostility toward federal litigation. The Chief Justice suggested
that a bankruptcy court in California had no business
adjudicating Vickie’s state law counterclaim, which was only
tangentially related to her bankruptcy filing, especially in light
of the fact that the same claim was simultaneously being
litigated in a Texas probate court.177 Given his goal of
preserving judicial resources and reducing the volume of
federal litigation, the Chief Justice was likely quite frustrated
with this duplication of judicial effort. The Chief Justice
concluded that Vickie’s state law claim should be resolved by
an expert on such claims—a state court in Texas.178
C.

The Stern Majority Lacks a Practical Understanding of
Bankruptcy Law

Another possible explanation for the Supreme Court’s
distinctive approach to bankruptcy court jurisdiction is that the
Justices forming the majority in Stern and the plurality in
Northern Pipeline lacked a working knowledge of the
bankruptcy process. As a result, they view a powerful
bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over state claims as a threat
to the integrity of Article III, not as a necessity to the effective
and efficient resolution of bankruptcy proceedings.179 In his
175

See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of how bankruptcy and district courts
are treating certain state law claims post-Stern.
176
See infra Part IV.A.
177
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2599, 2619-20 (2011). As a nod to
principles of Federalism, the Chief Justice cites to the United States Code. See id. at
2619-20. “Section 1334(c)(2) . . . requires that bankruptcy courts abstain from hearing
specified non-core, state claims that ‘can be timely adjudicated[] in a State forum of
appropriate jurisdiction.’” Id. (emphasis added).
178
Id. at 2619-20. “Section 1334(c)(1) . . . provides that bankruptcy courts may
abstain from hearing any proceeding, including core matters, ‘in the interest of comity
with State courts or respect for State law.’” Id. at 2620.
179
The members of the Supreme Court are aware that, after years of service
on the Court, their practical understanding of legal practice on the ground in
courtrooms across the country may be outdated. In a profound moment of candor in
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study of the history of the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy
jurisprudence, Professor Klee observes that, “Because Justices
at a particular time may be unfamiliar with bankruptcy law,
the Court may render a decision that causes more problems
than it resolves.”180 That might explain why the majority
opinion in Stern dismissed the possibility of any practical
consequences of narrowing the scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, while the dissent vehemently disagreed with the
majority’s operating assumption.181 Four of the five Justices in
the majority—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia,
and Thomas—are new textualists, who resolve bankruptcy
questions by focusing on the plain meaning of the Constitution
and statutory provisions in question.182 On the other hand, the
author of the dissent, Justice Breyer—a notable scholar of
administrative law183—examines bankruptcy questions from a
less theoretical perspective and pragmatically “looks to the
purpose the statute addresses as a point of first inquiry.”184
Whereas the new textualists of the majority were concerned
with weighty separation-of-powers issues and protecting
Article III from even “slight encroachment[]” by Congress and
the bankruptcy courts,185 the author of the dissent, who has had
substantial exposure to the nuances of bankruptcy practice, is
concerned with providing debtors and creditors with “an efficient,
effective federal bankruptcy system.”186 Similarly, in his dissent in
questioning his decision to dissent to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Justice Scalia reflected,
Justice Douglas, who in earlier years on the Court had been wont to note his
disagreements with proposed changes [to the Federal Rules], generally
abstained from doing so later on, acknowledging that his expertise had grown
stale. Never having specialized in trial practice, I began at the level of
expertise (and of acquiescence in others’ proposals) with which Justice
Douglas ended.
146 F.R.D. 401, 513.
180
KLEE, supra note 165, at 5. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the
potential implications of Stern.
181
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
182
See KLEE, supra note 165, at 14 n.47.
183
See generally, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY (1992).
184
See KLEE, supra note 165, at 14 n.47.
185
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
186
Id. at 2629 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer offers a hypothetical
based on an actual bankruptcy case in which a tenant, who had previously filed for
bankruptcy, brings a counterclaim against a creditor—her landlord—for committing
several housing violations under state law. As a result of Stern, those claims would
have to be brought in state court, delaying the debtor-tenant’s access to relief and
making the relief more costly. Id. at 2629-30.
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Northern Pipeline, Justice White criticized the plurality for
failing to comprehend that “the bankruptcy judge is constantly
enmeshed in state-law issues.”187 Justice White lambasted the
plurality for deciding the case on the “intricacies of the
separation-of-powers doctrine” when “abstract theory . . . has
little to do with the reality of bankruptcy proceedings.”188
D.

Stern Reflects a Longstanding Antipathy of Article III
Judges Toward Bankruptcy Courts

A more controversial explanation for the Supreme
Court’s decision to twice reign in the adjudicative authority of
bankruptcy courts harks back to the long-standing turf war
between Article III judges and bankruptcy judges.189 As noted
earlier, the judicial officers who are now known as bankruptcy
judges were formerly known as bankruptcy referees.190 In 1973,
however, as bankruptcy law became a more prominent practice
area, the Supreme Court promulgated the new Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, which conferred the title “bankruptcy
judges” on those erstwhile referees.191 Although in certain
federal districts the new bankruptcy judges were permitted by
their Article III counterparts to wear black robes, most federal
districts prohibited bankruptcy judges from riding in the
Article III judges’ elevators, parking in the Article III judges’
spaces, and eating in the dining rooms reserved for Article III
judges.192 This antipathy of Article III judges toward
bankruptcy judges reportedly stems from the fact that
bankruptcy judges preside over a multitude of issues that are
the traditional business of Article III judges, who viewed
187

N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 96-99 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting). Fittingly, before serving on the Supreme Court, Justice White
was a prominent corporate attorney who “developed [a] specialized knowledge of
bankruptcy [law]” while “negotiating real estate deals . . . [and] structuring financial
mechanisms for various commercial transactions.” DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN
WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 227 (1998).
188
N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 96-99 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
189
See Dan Schecter, Statutory Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Hear and
Determine Compulsory State-Law Counterclaims Against Non-Bankrupt Claimants Is
Unconstitutional, 2011 COMM. FIN. NEWSL. 51 (2011).
190
Countryman, supra note 46, at 22.
191
Id.
192
Id. Reflecting on his experience as a judicial law clerk twenty-two years
ago, Professor Lawless recalls that the bankruptcy judges in his district were not
allowed to ride in elevators reserved for “regular federal judges.” Bob Lawless, Anna
Nicole Smith May Be More Than Just the Only Loser on This One, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan.
23, 2011, 4:33 PM), http//www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/anna-nicole-smithmay-be-more-than-just-the-only-loser-on-this-one.html.
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widening the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction as an
encroachment of their exclusive domain.193
The tense relationship between Article III judges and
bankruptcy judges hit fever pitch during the congressional
hearings held in the run up to the passage of the 1978 Act.194 As
Congress contemplated expanding the scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, Congress wrestled with the related issue of
whether to grant bankruptcy judges Article III status.195 Both
the bankruptcy bar and bankruptcy judges favored the move to
Article III status, viewing it as a way to elevate the status of
the bankruptcy profession, which was perceived as a secondtier practice area until the restructuring boom of the 1980s and
1990s. The most vocal critics of the change in status of
bankruptcy judges were Article III judges, who were
antagonistic to bankruptcy practice and believed that
bestowing Article III status on bankruptcy judges would
diminish the prestige of Article III judges.196 During a
congressional hearing, for instance, when asked by the counsel
to the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
whether bankruptcy judges should have law clerks to assist
them with their work, District Judge Wesley E. Brown
responded, “I do not think they need a law clerk. That is why
they were appointed in the first place . . . .”197
At another hearing on the issue, Judge Simon H.
Rifkind referred to bankruptcy judges as “assistants to [Article
III] judges.” Moreover, Judge Rifkind testified, “A significant
increase in the number of Article III judges as is contemplated
by the proposed law would, in my opinion, dilute the prestige of
district judges,” which would make it more difficult to lure the
most qualified and talented lawyers away from private practice
to serve on the federal bench.198

193

Id.
See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA 141-83 (2001). See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the 1978 Act.
195
SKEEL, supra note 194, at 157.
196
Id. at 157-58.
197
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary United States
Senate, 95th Cong. 429 (1977) (statement of Judge Wesley E. Brown, U.S. District
Court, Wichita, Kansas).
198
Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on H.R. 8200, Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (statement of Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, Immediate Past President, American
College of Trial Lawyers).
194
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The result was that Congress voted to grant broad
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts without officially granting
them Article III status.199 The jurisdictional grant of the 1978
Act represented a compromise—an attempt to placate both the
bankruptcy community and the Article III judges.
The climax of the dispute occurred when Chief Justice
Warren Burger actively lobbied President Carter to not sign
the 1978 Act.200 This intervention of the Chief Justice into the
legislative process was unprecedented. Chief Justice Burger
shared the same fears as his colleagues on the district courts
that the appointment of “inferior” bankruptcy judges would
dilute the prestige and talent of Article III courts.201 According
to Professor Skeel, during the debate, Chief Justice Burger
quite tellingly asked a legal scholar, “Would you accept a
bankruptcy judgeship?”202 Ultimately, President Carter did sign
the 1978 Act into law despite such opposition. However, the
Supreme Court would have the final word on the debate a few
years later, when it ruled in Northern Pipeline that the broad
jurisdictional grant was unconstitutional.203
Although the Court’s composition has changed since
then, the majority opinion in Stern appears to embody the
same antipathy toward bankruptcy judges, and it is just as
protective of the Article III domain as its predecessor. In the
closing paragraphs of Stern, perhaps referencing bankruptcy
judges and the bankruptcy bar, Chief Justice Roberts observed,
“Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which
legions of power can seek new territory to capture.”204
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF STERN V. MARSHALL ON THE
FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS’ AUTHORITY

Stern has already elicited a frenetic response in
courtrooms and among the legal academy. As of February 16,
2013, a little over a year and a half after the Supreme Court
handed down Stern v. Marshall, the case had been cited by 705

199

SKEEL, supra note 194, at 158.
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. (emphasis added).
203
See supra Part I.C.
204
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 39 (1957)).
200
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courts nationwide and by 571 scholarly sources.205 In an
epigraph to his opinion, the Chief Justice likened the procedural
history of Stern to the litigation in the novel Bleak House, about
which Charles Dickens wrote, “This suit has, in course of time,
become so complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk
about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement
as to all the premises.”206 The same thing might be said about
Stern’s aftermath. In a recent article, one commentator astutely
noted, “The issues surrounding Stern seem to be proliferating on
a weekly basis and cannot all be addressed here.”207 For that
reason, this section will focus only on two issues that have
already caused a flurry of speculation among commentators.
This section will first discuss Stern’s effect on bankruptcy courts’
ability to enter final judgments on fraudulent conveyance
claims. Finally, this section will discuss Stern’s impact on the
ability of parties to consent to the bankruptcy courts’ authority
to enter a final judgment on “non-core-related-to” matters that
are not necessary to the resolution of the bankruptcy. This
section argues that Stern’s holding should be applied narrowly,
and that the case should have no impact on the bankruptcy
court’s authority to hear fraudulent conveyance claims nor on a
litigant’s ability to consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
A.

Stern Does Not Preclude a Bankruptcy Court from Entering
a Final Judgment on a Fraudulent Conveyance Claim

One immediate consequence of Stern has been
speculation as to whether bankruptcy courts have the
authority to enter final judgments on fraudulent conveyance
claims. Although the Bankruptcy Code contains a fraudulent
transfer provision,208 such claims have their origin in early-

205

According to the KeyCite tool on Westlaw.com, Stern v. Marshall has been
cited by 25 Circuit Court of Appeals, 201 district courts, 472 bankruptcy courts, and 6
state courts (as of Feb. 16, 2013).
206
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, in 1
WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 4-5 (1891)). Compare Schecter, supra note 189 (arguing
that Stern will not be a “game-changer”), with HON. NANCY C. DREHER, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL § 2:12 n.10 (arguing that Stern’s impact will be broad).
207
Frank Volk, First Impressions: Interpreting Stern, 30-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
22 (2011). In a section on its bankruptcy blog appropriately titled “The Stern Files,” the law
firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP monitors and analyzes Stern’s impact on noteworthy
bankruptcy cases. See Kyle Ortiz, The Stern Files, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011),
http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/category/stern-files/#axzz2ILR4w800.
208
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
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seventeenth-century English common law.209 According to 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H), “proceedings to determine, avoid, or
recover fraudulent conveyances” are “core” claims.210 As
discussed earlier, if a claim is “core,” a bankruptcy court may
hear it and enter a final judgment on the claim.211 Post-Stern,
litigants have argued that fraudulent conveyance claims so
closely resemble Vickie’s counterclaim that the same logic
should apply, prohibiting bankruptcy courts from entering a
final judgment on them.212 If that were the case, bankruptcy
courts would only be able to issue proposed findings of facts
and conclusions of law that would be reviewed de novo by the
district court.213 On the other hand, others argue that even if
the Supreme Court’s separate, stricter analytical approach to
Article III for bankruptcy courts is applied, bankruptcy courts
will likely retain the authority to enter final judgments on
fraudulent conveyance claims.
As Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain of the Southern
District of New York observed in a recent opinion, “Reasonable
people may differ over whether Stern’s prohibition on the
bankruptcy court’s issuance of a final judgment extends to
fraudulent transfer claims.”214 Indeed, as federal district and
bankruptcy court judges attempt to make sense of Stern’s
impact on this issue, they are slowly dividing into two opposing
camps. The first camp favors a broad reading of Stern that
prohibits bankruptcy courts from entering final judgments on
fraudulent conveyance claims.215 By contrast, the second camp
argues that Stern must be read narrowly and that the
authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on such
claims remains unchanged.216

209

Fraudulent conveyance claims trace their origin back to the Star Chamber
in England. See Twyne’s Case, 3 Coke, 80 (1601).
210
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (2006).
211
Id. Congress has created a federal right of action for the trustee in bankruptcy
to pursue the recovery and avoidance of fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
212
See e.g., Picard v. Flinn Invs., LLC, 463 B.R. 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
213
See supra Part I.C.3.
214
Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
215
See e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins.
Agency, Inc.), No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836, at *2-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012);
Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 919 (6th Cir. 2012); Kirschner v. Agoglia, 476 B.R. 75,
79-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Stettin v. Regent Capital Partners, LLC (In re Rothstein,
Rosenfeldt, Adler, P.A.), No. 11-62612-CIV, 2012 WL 882497, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
14, 2012); Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 464
B.R. 348, 352-54 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
216
See e.g., KHI Liquidation Trust v. Wisenbaker Builder Servs., Inc. (In re
Kimball Hill, Inc.), 480 B.R. 894, 899-904 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Feuerbacher v. Moser, No.
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In In re Heller Ehrmann LLP, Judge Charles R. Breyer
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
ruled that Stern prevents a bankruptcy court from entering a
final judgment on a fraudulent conveyance claim.217 Judge
Breyer was not persuaded by the debtor’s argument that Stern
applies narrowly and only to counterclaims such as Vickie’s.218
Nor was he persuaded by the argument that fraudulent
conveyance claims are necessary for the complete resolution of
a bankruptcy proceeding.219 Instead, Judge Breyer relied on the
plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, which limited
Congress’s authority to create non-Article III adjudicative
bodies to three specific exceptions,220 including territorial courts,
military courts, and the adjudication of public rights.221 Because
the adjudication of a fraudulent conveyance claim does not fall
within any of the three exceptions, Judge Breyer reasoned that
the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter a final
judgment on the claim.222
On the opposite coast, Judge Drain ruled that Stern’s
holding does not prohibit bankruptcy courts from entering a
final judgment on fraudulent conveyance claims.223 Unlike Judge
Breyer, Judge Drain placed great significance on Chief Justice
Roberts’s declaration that Stern should be read narrowly.224
Although the adjudication of a fraudulent conveyance claim does
not fall within one of the three exceptions specified by the
Northern Pipeline plurality, Judge Drain observed, citing Justice
Scalia’s concurrence, that “there are at least seven different
reasons given in the [Stern] Court’s opinion for concluding that
an Article III judge was required to adjudicate [Vickie’s]
4:11-CV-272, 2012 WL 1070138, at *5-9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2012); Bohm v. Titus (In re
Titus), 467 B.R. 592, 633-34 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012); In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. at 183-94.
217
In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 464 B.R. at 350, 352-54.
218
Id. at 352.
219
Id. at 353.
220
Id. at 353-54. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of Northern Pipeline.
221
In Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 31 (1989), the Supreme Court
ruled that a bankruptcy trustee’s right to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim was a
private right, not a public right. Id. at 34. The Court explained that a “public right”
included “but [was] not limited to a matter arising between the Government and
others,” which also “extends to a seemingly ‘private’ right that is closely intertwined
with a federal regulatory program that Congress has power to enact.” Id.
222
In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 464 B.R. at 354. In In re Bellingham, the Ninth
Circuit adopted Judge Breyer’s reasoning and reached the same conclusion that
bankruptcy courts lack the authority to enter final judgments on fraudulent
conveyance claims. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins.
Agency, Inc.), No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836, at *2-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012).
223
Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
224
Id. at 191.
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lawsuit.”225 Judge Drain placed less significance on the Northern
Pipeline plurality opinion and instead located the authority for
bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on fraudulence
conveyance claims in two places.226
First, although fraudulent conveyance claims were
originally creatures of common law, Congress created a federal
right of action to pursue such claims in bankruptcy courts.227 This
is significant because Northern Pipeline and Stern dealt with
claims that were derived exclusively from state common law. This
means that a fraudulent conveyance claim brought in a
bankruptcy court under federal law more closely resembles the
federal claims brought in Crowell, Thomas, and Schor than the
state common law claims brought in Northern Pipeline and Stern.
Citing Stern, Judge Drain pointed out that “[u]nlike the state law
tortious interference claim in Stern, the Trustee’s fraudulent
transfer claim here ‘flow[s] from a federal statutory scheme’” and
is “completely dependent upon adjudication of a claim created
by federal law.”228 Thus, because a bankruptcy court—a court
created by Congress—is adjudicating a congressionally created
right of action, the constitutional concerns that arose in
Northern Pipeline and in Stern are likely not in play.
Second, Judge Drain found support in Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Stern that “Article III judges are required in all
federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established
historical practice to the contrary.”229 Fraudulent transfer claims
have played a critical role in the resolution of bankruptcy cases
since the 18th century.230 If the question were ever to reach the
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia could provide the swing-vote in
what might be another 5-4 decision permitting bankruptcy
courts to enter final judgments on fraudulent conveyance claims
because of established historical practice.
Judge Drain’s narrow reading of Stern, which retains
the “core” status of fraudulent conveyance claims, is preferable
to Judge Breyer’s broader reading for several reasons. First,
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly emphasized that the holding
225

Id. at 186-87 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
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of Stern is narrow. In contrast, in Northern Pipeline, the
Supreme Court was quite clear about its intention to invalidate
the bankruptcy court regime in its entirety.231 Had the Court
meant to achieve that result again, it would not have repeatedly
emphasized the narrowness of its ruling. Furthermore,
fraudulent conveyance claims are an integral part of most
bankruptcy cases. As Judge Drain explained, “Such claims
often play a prominent role in bankruptcy cases, either because
of their sheer numbers or because of the effect that the
potential avoidance of a transfer, lien, or obligation may have
on creditors’ recoveries.”232
Unlike Vickie’s counterclaim, which was tangentially
related to her bankruptcy case, fraudulent conveyance claims
play a central role in the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations. This is especially true in modern business
bankruptcy cases involving transfers of large amounts of
money to third parties—for example, in cases involving Ponzi
schemes and other frauds.233 If fraudulent conveyance claims
are no longer “core” and the bankruptcy court cannot enter a
final judgment, litigants will have more opportunities to
engage in gamesmanship.234 The defendant in a fraudulent
conveyance action could, for example, begin litigating the claim
in bankruptcy court. However, if the proceeding appeared to be
going in the plaintiff’s favor, the defendant could seek to have
the claim removed to a potentially more favorable forum. Also,
litigation in the bankruptcy court moves at a quicker pace than
in the district court. This could incentivize deep-pocketed
defendants to remove fraudulent conveyance claims to district
courts or state courts in order to prolong the litigation and
deter cash-strapped debtors from pursuing claims. Eliminating
fraudulent conveyance claims from the core jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts would encourage a “constitutionally
required game of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts [that]
would lead to inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless
additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”235
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Stern Likely Will Not Affect Consent

In the aftermath of Stern, the bankruptcy community is
also pondering whether litigants can still consent to
bankruptcy courts’ authority to enter a final judgment on “noncore-related-to” matters that are not necessary to the resolution
of the bankruptcy.236 In other words, could Pierce have consented
to having a bankruptcy judge enter a final judgment on Vickie’s
counterclaim? In Schor, Justice O’Connor framed Article III as
not only a protector of broad “structural interests” but also as a
protector of “personal interests.”237 In certain instances, when the
structural interests in play are de minimis, parties may waive
their right to an Article III adjudicator and permit, for
example, a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on a
claim.238 Post-Stern, the issue becomes whether the Article III
structural interests that compelled the result in Stern are of
such magnitude that even the consent of both litigants could
not cure the constitutional defects that troubled the Chief
Justice and other Justices in the majority.
The majority opinion does not expressly decide whether
parties may consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. In fact,
Stern contains conflicting statements that have caused
confusion among bankruptcy commentators.239 In one passage,
Chief Justice Roberts stated, “The ‘experts’ in the federal
system at resolving common law counterclaims such as Vickie’s
are the Article III courts, and it is with those courts that her
claim must stay.”240 Reading this sentence in isolation would
seem to suggest that the majority no longer considers consent
an option because of the broader separation of powers issues.
In the very next paragraph, however, Chief Justice Roberts
appears to suggest that consent to jurisdiction is still possible.
The Chief Justice stated that Stern’s holding was reached
simply by substituting the word “tort” for “contract” into the
holding of Northern Pipeline, which “establish[ed] only that
236
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Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to
adjudicate, render final judgment and issue binding orders in a
traditional contract action arising under state law, without
consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate
review.”241 Thus, on its face, the majority opinion is internally
inconsistent with respect to its treatment of consent.
The majority’s contradictory statements regarding
consent have created the first Stern circuit split.242 In In re
Bellingham, the Ninth Circuit recently held that Stern does not
affect a litigant’s ability to waive his right to have a non-core
claim adjudicated by an Article III court and to consent to have
the claim adjudicated by a bankruptcy court.243 However, in
Waldman v. Stone, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a litigant’s
right to Article III adjudication of a non-core claim was not
waivable.244 This split has arisen as a result of the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits’ different interpretations of Schor. In Schor, the
Court explained that Article III protects “structural interests,”
such as the integrity and independence of the judicial branch,
while also protecting “personal interests” like the right to an
impartial and independent adjudicator.245 Although litigants
may never waive rights relating to structural interests,
litigants can waive rights relating to personal interests.246 The
Sixth Circuit characterized the right to an Article III
adjudication of a non-core claim as a “nonwaivable structural
principle.”247 Citing Schor, the Sixth Circuit described consent
as a way for Congress to shift the judicial power of the United
States to judges who lack the protections of Article III, “for the
purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”248 On the other
hand, while also quoting Schor, the Ninth Circuit characterized
a litigant’s right to an Article III adjudication as personal and
thus “subject to waiver.”249
241
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Despite the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, consent under 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is likely to remain permissible for two
reasons. First, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, suggested
that non-Article III courts should only be permitted to
adjudicate Article III claims if there is historical precedent for
doing so.250 In Waldman, the Sixth Circuit failed to acknowledge
the long line of historical precedent that permits litigants to
consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. According to a 1945
note in the Yale Law Journal, “although claimants to property
involved in bankruptcy proceedings are ordinarily entitled to
plenary suit in a state or federal forum in accordance with
Section 23 of the [1898 Act], their rights may be adjudicated [in
the bankruptcy court] . . . when [both litigants] consent.”251
Plenary suits under the 1898 Act can be thought of as
analogous to “non-core-but-related-to” claims. Furthermore, a
line of Supreme Court cases dating back to 1902 affirmed
parties’ ability to consent to jurisdiction under the 1898 Act.252
In Macdonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., the Court held,
“We can perceive no reason why the privilege of claiming the
benefits of the procedure in a plenary suit . . . may not be
waived by consent, as any other procedural privilege of the
suitor may be waived, and a more summary procedure
substituted.”253 Considering the long-standing tradition of
permitting consent in cases filed under the 1898 Act and the
Supreme Court’s recurring approval of consent throughout the
first part of the twentieth century, the modern Court is likely
to leave the ability of parties to consent to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction undisturbed.
Second, a determination of consent as unconstitutional
could have far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the
arena of bankruptcy courts. The Committee on Courts and the
Administrative System of the National Bankruptcy Conference
suggests that if consent under § 157(c)(2) were ruled
unconstitutional, then the provision under the Federal
Magistrate Act that permits litigants to consent to the
adjudication of claims by magistrate judges would, by analogy,
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also be unconstitutional.254 According to the bankruptcy counsel
for the National Association of Attorneys General, the consent
provisions for both magistrate and bankruptcy courts “will rise
and fall together.”255 Perhaps in an attempt to resolve any
confusion surrounding this issue and keep the federal docket
moving efficiently, the Fifth Circuit raised, sua sponte, the
question of whether Stern affected litigants’ ability to consent
to magistrate judges’ authority to enter a final judgment on
state law counterclaims.256 The Fifth Circuit interpreted Stern’s
holding narrowly and held that magistrates did in fact
maintain such authority.257
Jurisdiction by consent in both the context of
bankruptcy courts and magistrate courts makes litigation more
efficient and less costly for litigants, and it also lightens the
already bulging docket of the district courts. If consent were
found unconstitutional, it could have profound consequences on
the efficiency of the federal judicial system. The Supreme Court
likely will refrain from disturbing an area of law that lower
courts and litigants have come to rely on so profoundly.258
CONCLUSION: THE WAITING RESUMES
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Northern
Pipeline, in which the Court invalidated the entire
jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts in one fell swoop,
Congress passed the 1984 Amendments to narrow the
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts in an attempt to cure the
constitutional infirmities that prompted the Court to act. Now,
post-Stern, the question is what should Congress do? In theory,
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Congress could respond in three ways. But only one course of
action truly makes sense.
First, Congress could pass a new set of amendments to
redraw and further narrow the boundaries of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, as it did after Northern Pipeline. This response is
overkill if the Chief Justice is to be taken at his word, for he
wrote that Stern’s holding is narrow and only applies to
counterclaims like Vickie’s. Whereas in Northern Pipeline, the
Court invalidated the entire bankruptcy jurisdiction scheme,
the Court in Stern opted to use a scalpel instead of a cleaver,
ruling only that the bankruptcy court could not enter a final
judgment on a state law counterclaim, which did not require
resolution in order to administer the bankruptcy case pending
before it. If Congress were to dismantle the bankruptcy regime
and start from scratch, it would upset the expectations of both
the litigants and the federal courts that have learned how to
navigate and rely on the current system.
Second, Congress could make bankruptcy courts more
like magistrate courts. Congress could do this by heightening
the appellate review standard for decisions rendered by
bankruptcy courts on “core” claims, making the standard more
comparable to that used by district courts when reviewing
magistrate judges’ decisions on dispositive motions. Currently,
magistrate judges’ decisions on dispositive motions are reviewed
de novo while decisions on “core” claims by bankruptcy judges
are reviewed under the deferential “clearly erroneous standard.”
Furthermore, Congress could reduce the wide scope of
remedies that bankruptcy courts are permitted to grant, which
would make bankruptcy courts more like magistrate courts and
other administrative law courts. Like the court in Crowell, for
example, the bankruptcy court would depend on the district
court for the enforcement of orders and judgments. While any
change that would bring bankruptcy courts more in line with
other non-Article III tribunals may soften the Court’s strict
application of Article III to bankruptcy courts, heightened
appellate review of core claims coupled with the reduction of
bankruptcy courts’ remedial powers would have devastating
consequences for litigants. Bankruptcy courts were created to
provide debtors and creditors an alternative forum to resolve
their disputes outside the traditional litigation channels, which
are typically costly and time consuming. In the world of
bankruptcy, time is money. If the debtor is truly going to
receive a fresh start and the creditors are going to receive their
fair share of the debtor’s assets, asset values can only be
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preserved if the bankruptcy court maintains authority to grant
powerful remedies in a timely fashion, without worrying about
having their orders constantly overturned on appeal.
The last option is for Congress to do nothing. Although
this may seem like the least constructive option, it is likely the
best course of action. As the federal courts start to realize the
narrowness of Stern’s holding, and as commentators have
taken time to digest it, business in the bankruptcy courts will
likely continue as usual—with the occasional district court
briefly putting down its rubber stamp to scrutinize a
bankruptcy court decision more closely than usual. As the
Chief Justice made clear, Stern will not change the status quo.
For now, in the fashion of Estragon and Vladimir, the
bankruptcy community resumes waiting for more definitive
answers from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
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